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Decisions of the Supreme Court under Earl Warren and to a lesser
extent under Warren Burger have stirred not only opposition on
the part of political activists whose interests and policies have suf-
fered but also dispute among scholars about broader problems of con-
stitutional interpretation and the roles of judges in a constitutional
democracy.' Raoul Berger now joins this debate in Government by
Judiciary.2 His initial aim is to reconstruct the legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment and to prove, in light of this history, that
recent judicial decisions on race, reapportionment, and criminal jus-
tice have expanded and twisted the amendment's meaning. Running
through the entire volume is the clearly articulated theme that the
principal, indeed the only, criterion for constitutional interpretation
is the "intent" of the framers. Original "intent" forever settles ques-
tions of public law and public policy.3
Part I of Government by Judiciary consists of a series of accounts
of the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the proposal of
its legitimator, the Fourteenth Amendment, by the 39th Congress.
Berger concludes that it is clear beyond even a razor-thin doubt that
the overwhelming majority of the amendment's supporters in Congress
t McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
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thought that section one proposed only modest changes in the political
system. These changes would enable newly freed blacks to do little
more than buy, own, sell, and contract for property in the same man-
ner as whites and enjoy the same procedural protections as whites if
they ran afoul of the criminal law.
The framers, Berger insists, intended neither the privileges and
immunities nor the due process clause to nationalize the Bill of Rights,
to confer suffrage on blacks or anyone else, 4 to outlaw racial segre-
gation, or to require the states to provide any services for anyone.
Rather, the privileges and immunities clause meant only that freed-
men were to have the kind of rights Justice Bushrod Washington
listed in Corfield v. Coryell.5 Due process included only procedures
that would allow a defendant in a criminal case to receive a fair
hearing. "The words 'equal protection of the laws,'" Berger adds,
"were meant to obviate discrimination by laws-that is, by statutes
-so that with respect to a limited group of privileges [rights to buy,
sell, own, and contract for property protected by the Civil Rights Act
of 1866], the laws would treat a black no differently than a white."
Thus, he finds that Justice Bradley's opinion for the Court in the
Civil Rights Cases7 "does not betray, but rather corresponds to, the
intention of the framers." s As the "key to. an understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment," Berger explains that "the North was shot
through with Negrophobia, that the Republicans, except for a mi-
nority of extremists, were swayed by the racism that gripped their
constituents rather than by abolitionist ideology."9
Part II consists of a series of essays on issues that range from the
intent of the framers of 1787, the meaning of the rule of law, and
the legitimacy of juries of six and nine persons, to the validity of
original intent as the overriding principle in constitutional interpre-
tation. Each essay focuses on an intrinsically important question, but
together they do not form a coherent presentation. Some follow up
on problems raised in Part I; others seem to bear little relation to
anything else in the book; a third category constitutes Berger's re-
sponses to anticipated criticism. Still, most of these essays describe
4. The penalty clause of § 2 provided the sole sanction for state denial of suffrage by
requiring a reduction of congressional representation. P. 64.
5. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
6. P. 191.
7. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
8. P. 190.
9. P. 10. Negrophobia was, no doubt, widespread in the North, but Berger probably
overestimates the prevalence of that neurosis among leaders of the Republican Party.
See M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 22-25 (1974).
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examples of, offenses against, or expansions on the basic thesis that
constitutional interpretation falls within the jurisdiction of the his-
torian.
In so doing, Berger is striking out boldly against much of consti-
tutional law, especially as it has developed since 1937. He shows con-
siderable courage for he also is opposing numerous constitutional
historians and commentators."0 Even though he stoically accepts the
methodology of George Sutherland and his colleagues, Berger rejects
their substantive views.". One is immediately reminded of William
Winslow Crosskey's even more sweeping attack in 1953.12 Like Cross-
key, Berger has framed arguments that throw much of the burden of
proof onto his intellectual adversaries, although, as will soon be evi-
dent, I believe that he fails to prove his own arguments. I shall con-
centrate on two problems: first, the methodology, style, and internal
logic of his analysis, and next, more fundamental questions of con-
stitutional interpretation.
I. Method and Logic
Unlike Crosskey, whose research into unpublished correspondence
and manuscripts was prodigious,'- Berger confines his analyses of the
"intent of the framers" to the public record. The Congressional Globe,
he believes, is a full, accurate, and authoritative account, "a steno-
graphic transcription"'14 not only of what Representatives and Senators
said but also of what they meant. Berger also limits the concept of
"framers" to the men at Philadelphia for the original Constitution
and to the members of the 39th Congress for the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Berger's almost total reliance on the Globe as the repository of the
"intent" of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment raises immediate
10. Among those whom he attacks are Alexander M. Bickel, Howard Jay Graham,
Thomas C. Grey, Robert J. Harris, Harold M. Hyman, Alfred H. Kelly, Arthur S. Miller,
Jacobus tenBroek, and William W. Van Alstyne.
11. P. 374 n.6. Berger does not mention that his own theory of constitutional inter-
pretation was most explicitly stated by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857). See note 47 infra.
12. 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 3-14 (1953). Berger's useful bibliog-
raphy does not have an entry for Crosskey although his work is central to the argument
in Part II.
13. To help explore the minds of the framers, Crosskey, in his two volume work,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1953), tried to construct an elaborate dictionary of
eighteenth century legal terms. Berger makes some effort in this direction when he
examines the three clauses of the second sentence of § I of the Fourteenth Amendment
(chs. 2-3, 10-11) but offers no real substance when he discusses the original Constitution.
14. P. 6.
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problems. First of all, it is not necessarily true that the Globe presents
a "stenographic transcription"' 5 of the debates. That stenographers
recorded such a transcription does not mean that it was published
as recorded. The Congressional Record of this century is frequently
a tale of what legislators want the future to think they said rather
than an account of what they actually said.10 What the situation was
then, I do not know; but the nearly perfect grammar of many of the
speeches offers evidence, albeit thin and indirect, that somebody did
some editing. Berger seems unaware of the problem. To convince
readers of the reliability of his principal sources, he should have
provided some evidence and a reasoned conclusion, not merely a
bald declaration.
Furthermore, even a verbatim record need no more explain what
a legislator intends by his vote than a judicial opinion need explain
a judge's vote. Both often are justifications rather than explanations,
and legislators tend to be more slippery about such matters than
judges. Even when accurately reporting words spoken on the floor, a
legislative record may provide only trappings for decisions and strate-
gies that would be embarrassing if candidly explained. 17
It is also questionable how much one can legitimately rely on the
speeches of some members of a legislature as evidence of the "intent"
of those who did not speak. People often vote for a measure in spite
of rather than because of the speeches of others. And, to paraphrase
Felix Frankfurter, in the end the members of the 39th Congress voted
on the Fourteenth Amendment, not on the speeches.' 8 Indeed it is
15. Id.
16. Under current practice, the editors of the Record.send proof copies to each legis-
lator who speaks, supposedly to allow correction of ungrammatical statements made in
the heat of debate. In fact, many legislators use this opportunity to improve the style
and substance of their speeches. Moreover, congressmen routinely "extend their remarks,"
that is, publish in the Record speeches that were never given. Even committee hearings
and reports are not immune from this sort of distortion. Possibly the most horrendous
example occurred in the fall of 1976 when the staff of a subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee published an eight-volume record of hearings, complete with
witty repartee, that were never held. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1976, at 15, col. 3.
17. The debate in the Senate in 1958 on the bill to change the Mallory rule regarding
admissibility of confessions offers an appropriate example. With the bill coming up
for a vote on the last evening of a legislative session during an election year, neither
the Majority Leader nor the proponents of the bill would have been able to muster a
quorum had Senator Wayne Morse carried out his threat to kill the bill by filibustering.
Both sides agreed to a dignified funeral for the bill. They would stage a mock debate
and the Vice President would rule favorably on a motion that the bill violated the oft-
ignored Senate Rule 27. Thus the foes of the Warren Court were allowed to lose-and
leave-gracefully. See IV. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 220-23 (1962).
18. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("Remarks of a particular proponent of the [Fourteenth) Amendment, no matter how
influential, are not to be deemed part of the Amendment. What was submitted for
ratification was his proposal, not his speech.")
1755
The Yale Law Journal
highly unlikely, and certainly difficult to prove, that a majority of
the men of 1866 shared a single intent on the complex issues knotted
into section 1. Certainly this cannot be proved by reliance on public
speeches. In fact, Berger's evidence often indicates not only differences
among the supporters of the amendment but also inconsistencies be-
tween remarks of particular individuals at different times.
Many of the amendment's supporters no doubt did share one inten-
tion-they wanted to win reelection in 1866. By then, the practice of
sending franked copies of speeches to constituents was already estab-
lished. One need not be a cynic to treat the rhetoric of an electoral cam-
paign as weak evidence of anything more than an intent to gain or
retain office;' 9 indeed, as other research has shown, 20 the Republican
supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment tended to be more liberal
than their constituents about the rights of freedmen.
Recognition of these sorts of problems could have led to a fascinat-
ing and much more useful analysis of what was happening in the
39th Congress. But for Berger the Globe is not merely a verbatim
record of the speeches of legislators who spoke with straight tongues
and open hearts, it is also a " 'transcript of their minds,' ",21 a truly
amazing claim for any public document, even in a year when speech-
makers are not running for reelection.
More generally, Berger's style of reasoning is often that of the clever
college debater rather than that of the careful scholar. For instance,
at one point he makes the argument, reasonable under many cir-
cumstances, that one should not accept the objections of opponents
as evidence of what a bill means.22 Yet, when an opponent's protests-
such as those cited in Andrew Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act
19. Berger also accepts other bits of evidence at face value. He relies on Marshall's
retreat in newspaper replies to critics of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), and Justice Henry Baldwin's eulogy of the Chief Justice to support the claim
that Marshall was a strict constructionist who adhered closely to the intent of the
framers. See pp. 375-76, 379. Whatever else he was, John Marshall was not a strict con-
structionist. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187-89 (1824) (opposing strict
construction). He was both an astute politician and a creative molder of the Constitution.
Thomas Jefferson complained in 1810 that Marshall's "twistifications in the case of
Marbury, in that of Burr, & the late Yazoo case shew how dexterously he can reconcile
law to his personal biasses ...." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May
25, 1810), reprinted in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 141 (Ford ed. 1905). Jefferson
added that in Marshall's hands, "the law is nothing more than an ambiguous text, to
be explained by his sophistry into any meaning which may subserve his personal malice."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (May 26, 1810), reprinted in 12 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 391 (Lipscomb ed. 1903). For other comments by Jefferson
on Marshall's strategy of constitutional interpretation, see 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HIsToRY 401-03, 518, 620-21 (rev. ed. 1926).
20. See M. BENEDiCr, supra note 9.
21. P. 372.
22. Pp. 97, 157-65.
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of 1866-support Berger's thesis, those objections become reliable
evidence. 23
Similarly, Berger says that a bill's managers speak with special au-
thority; and frequently he quotes Jacob M. Howard, the Fourteenth
Amendment's manager in the Senate. 24 But when Howard declares
that the Fourteenth Amendment will nationalize the Bill of Rights-a
statement that Representative John A. Bingham also made when he
introduced the amendment in the House25-Berger dismisses him as
" 'one of the most ... reckless of the radicals' " and one of the " 'ex-
treme Negrophiles,' "26 whose opinion "needs to be taken, in the
words of the 'immortal' Samuel Goldwyn, with 'a bushel of salts.' "27
Berger is similarly inconsistent in evaluating the use of governmen-
tal practice as evidence of constitutional meaning. When that prac-
tice runs counter to his thesis, he approvingly quotes Lord Chief
Justice Denman: " 'The practice of a ruling power in the State is
but a feeble proof of its legality.' "28 When, on the other hand, prac-
tice supports Berger's thesis, he cites Coke to the effect that " 'usage
and ancient course maketh law.' "20
Nor are Berger's evidence and reasoning convincing when he con-
tends that the second sentence of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment3" had a narrow and specific set of meanings. In according due
process solely a procedural meaning, he has the least serious difficulties.
Certainly such a claim is sound for the Fifth Amendment, and, while
somewhat less robust, is still strong for the Fourteenth. Wynehamer
v. New York, 31 which had tried to impart a substantive spirit into
due process, he dismisses as "a sport.' 32 But similar ideas were in the
wind, as evidenced by Taney's opinion in Dred Scott,3 3 and in some
abolitionists' arguments against slavery.3 4 Instead of conceding this
23. Pp. 162-63, 170.
24. See pp. 30, 56, 60, 65, 103, 227.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1089-90 (1866). Berger is more careful in
dealing with Bingham, whom he calls, with some justification, "a confused thinker."
P. 95.




30. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
32. P. 255.
33. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
34. As early as 1837, Salmon Portland Chase was arguing that slavery violated the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment as well as "the whole spirit of the consti-
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point, Berger relegates Dred Scott to a footnote,35 saying that be-
cause that decision was anathema to abolitionists, they would not have
used its reasoning. Without doubt, the ruling was anathema to abo-
litionists; but the notion that due process could protect certain basic,
"natural rights" was an idea some abolitionists could and did accept.
Equal protection gives Berger more difficulty. His statement that
common lawyers in the 1860s would have confined the concept of
"laws" to statutes30 is startling. That chance remarks in debates used
the word "statutes" by no means implies that a generic term like
"laws" would have had so limited a content. If its drafters had so
narrow an intent and had been even barely competent lawyers, they
would have worded the clause to require only "equal protection of
statutes." The obvious conclusion is that they had something broader
in mind.
Moreover, if, as Berger claims, the legislators of the 39th Congress
"meant to outlaw discrimination only with respect to the rights
enumerated" in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,37 they chose the wrong
words. If their intent was as he describes, they failed miserably in
their duty by not listing the "enumerated privileges" as, in fact, they
had done in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Rather, as Justice Strong
pointed out in Strauder v. West Virginia:38 "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment makes no attempt to enumerate the rights it designed to protect.
It speaks in general terms, and those are as comprehensive as pos-
sible."39 Berger's effort to restrict "privileges and immunities" is simi-
larly flawed. He asserts that the words had the same meaning as those
in Article IV, section 2, and quotes legislators as saying that the Four-
teenth Amendment's clause was "drawn from" or had "roots in" Ar-
ticle IV. Brought to the amendment via Justice Washington's opinion
tution." Moreover, he found slavery "subversive of the fundamental principles on which
all society rests." See SPEECH OF SALMON P. CHASE IN THE CASE OF THE COLORED WOMAN,
MATILDA (Utica 1837); Chase's letter in LIBERTY OR SLAVERY: DANIEL O'CONNELL ON
AMERICAN SLAVERY (Cincinatti 1863); and his speech in CONG. GLOBE, App., 33d Cong., Ist
Sess. 133 (1854). Other abolitionists, notably Lysander Spooner and William Goodell, were
also groping for a concept like substantive due process to connect their ideas about natural
law and right with the Constitution's Preamble and specific guarantees of liberty such as
habeas corpus. W. GOODELL, VIEWS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ITS BEARING
UPON AMERICAN SLAVERY 57-63 (2d ed. Utica 1845); L. SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SLAVERY 56-81 (Boston 1845). See also R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 154-58 (1975); Graham,
Procedure to Substance-Extrajudicial Rise of Due Process 1830-1860, 40 CALIF. L. REv.
483 (1952); Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law, in Dur PROCESS (NOMOS XVIII J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
35. P. 204 n.36.
36. Pp. 176, 191.
37. P. 176; see p. 167.
38. 100 U.S. 303 (1874).
39. Id. at 310.
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on circuit in Corfield v. Coryell40 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
these terms, Berger argues, had become "words of art."41 That some
members of the 39th Congress so stated, he amply demonstrates. But
there is a wide gap between "drawn from" or "rooted in" and "the
same as." And this gap is not bridged by Senator Howard's dec-
laration 42 that "we may gather some intimation of what probably
will be the opinion of the judiciary by referring to . . .Corfield v.
Coryell." 43
More importantly, if the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
thought that they were doing no more than repeating Article IV, sec-
tion 2, one might ask why they bothered with such a repetition. At
first the answer seems easy: they wanted to prevent states from dis-
criminating against their own citizens, especially against freedmen.
But if that is what the privileges and immunities clause means, it
merely repeats the equal protection clause. Furthermore, the framers'
choice of language is passing strange if they only wanted to repeat
Article IV, section 2. "Privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States" implies some substantive rights as United States citi-
zens, rights that go beyond "privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states." This logic is supported by the fact that the
clause is preceded immediately by the definition of citizens of the
United States. In that context, assertions by both the Senate and
House managers that the Fourteenth Amendment would nationalize
the Bill of Rights do not appear to be the peculiar aberrations that
Berger claims they were. These pieces of evidence do not settle the
40. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Berger stresses congressional reliance
on Corfield as an indication of legislative intent behind the privileges and immunities
clause. But this leaves Berger saddled with another element of that opinion: Justice
Washington's inclusion of the right to vote as among the "privileges and immunities"
protected by Article IV. Thus, Berger has to assert that Washington was wrong on that
point, yet he offers no evidence that the members of the 39th Congress intended to
exclude voting from the rights imported from Corlield to Article IV.
41. P. 51.
42. Berger omits an important qualification that Howard made. In introducing the
proposed amendment in the Senate, Howard said that a discussion of the full meaning
of "privileges and immunities" would be "barren." Then, after noting that the Supreme
Court had never ruled on the problem, he quoted at length from Washington's opinion
in Corlield, without taking exception to the Justice's inclusion of the right to vote, and
concluded:
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the second section
of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these privileges and immunities, what-
ever they may be-for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire ex-
tent and precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights guaranteed
and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution ....
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). Rather than implying a limited and
specific meaning for the phrase, Howard's remarks suggest room for flexible interpretation.
43. P. 103 (emphasis added).
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debate over incorporation, 44 but they do indicate that the record is
far less clear than Berger would lead us to believe.
In sum, Berger's arguments would be more convincing were they
more modest. Had he confessed his assumptions about his principal
source, the possible incompleteness of the evidence, and the existence
of significant differences among the amendment's supporters, he would
have raised fewer doubts about the validity of his argument. That
many, perhaps most, of the members of the 39th Congress had in
mind less sweeping changes in social and political institutions than
our generation is probably true.4 5 It is also probably true that many
latter-day historians, commentators, and judges have been moved by
their zeal for reform to read their own preferences into the legisla-
tive record. But Berger's style leads one to believe he is not immune
to the same sin.
II. Intent and Constitutional Interpretation
Government by Judiciary is more than an effort to correct the his-
torical record of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment. More
fundamentally, it is an attempt to influence judges and commentators
by explaining and justifying a theory of interpretation of the Con-
stitution and all its amendments. That theory is straightforward: con-
stitutional interpretation is a matter merely of discovering, announc-
ing, and applying the intent of the framers. 46 Although few others
state that theory so sharply,47 many scholars and judges share Berger's
44. A chief argument in the incorporation debate appears in Justice Black's dissenting
opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). See generally H. F LcK, THE
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908) (discussing adoption of Fourteenth
Amendment and related legislation during Reconstruction); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV.
5 (1949) (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment was intended only to incorporate some of
Bill of Rights); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Judicial Interpretation, 2 id. 140 (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment did not in-
corporate Bill of Rights). Another commentator concluded in 1956 that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had had modest aims, yet in 1975 he indicated that he had come
to believe that the framers intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights. Compare J. JAMES,
THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956) with James, Is the Fourteenth
Amendment Constitutional? 50 Soc. Sci. 3, 9 n.2 (1975).
45. See, e.g., James, supra note 44. See generally M. BENEDICr, suPra note 9 (describing
divisions between radical and conservative Republicans).
46. Carried to its logical conclusion, Berger's reasoning that constitutional interpre-
tation consists almost solely of historical research would argue for creation of a special
federal court in the United States along the lines of the Constitutional Court of the
Federal Republic of Germany. A special tribunal of this kind would be staffed by pro-
fessional historians rather than lawyers and would have exclusive jurisdiction over ques-
tions-though not necessarily the final disposition of cases-involving the meaning of the
Constitution.
47. But see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405, 426 (1857) (Taney, C.J.):
[The Constitution] speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning
and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was
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felt need to anchor their interpretations in the "intent" of the framers.
The proper response must come at several levels. First, and this ob-
jection is specific to Berger, his justifications for reliance on intent
disintegrate under close analysis. There is a second objection, not
specific to Berger: the difficulties that confront any painstakingly
thorough and intellectually scrupulous researcher who tries to estab-
lish legislative intent are typically insuperable. Ignoring these diffi-
culties, as Berger does, does not remove them. Third, there is the
argument, again not specific to Berger, that even if a researcher were
to overcome the first two obstacles, the practical results of habitual
reliance on original intent are likely to be disastrous and thus they
can hardly have been intended by framers who were intelligent and
patriotic.
A. Berger's Justifications
Berger offers four sets of justifications for interpretation ruled by
the intent of the framers. First, according to "traditional canons of
interpretation, the intention of the framers being unmistakenly ex-
pressed, that intention is as good as written into the text."48 In sup-
port of this assertion about judicial tradition, he cites a treatise on
English law dealing with statutes.49 Why English practice regarding
statutes should control American practice regarding the Constitution,
Berger never explains. Although he also cites three decisions of the
Supreme Court that accord with the English view,50 these opinions
also deal with statutory interpretation. Moreover none of them utilizes
legislative history as a means of discovering intent.
The distinction between statutory and constitutional interpretation
is one that Berger does not grasp or, if he understands, does not care
about. At other points, he quotes Justice Frankfurter as agreeing
that the legislator's intent controls but fails to acknowledge that Frank-
furter was speaking of statutory, not constitutional interpretation.
voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of con-
struction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere
reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
Cf. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dis-
senting) (framers' intent controls interpretation).
48. P. 7.
49. M. BACON, A NEw ABRIDGMENT or THE LAW (7th ed. London 1832).
50. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903); United States v. Babbit, 66 U.S. (1
Black) 55, 61 (1861); United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 565 (1845). Actually
the statement regarding intent is dictum in Babbit, for, immediately after the passage
Berger cites, the Court added: "But we do not place our decision upon this ground."
The point is pedantic and trivial, not worth mentioning except for the fact it is the
sort of thing for which Berger criticizes others.
1761
The Yale Law Journal
Berger criticizes Frankfurter as inconsistent because he sometimes
reasoned that legislative intent did not control.51 In the cases cited
by Berger, however, Frankfurter was consistent. He applied the rule
regarding the primacy of legislative intent to statutes but denied that
the rule controlled cases involving constitutional interpretation. 2
Nor do Berger's efforts to place Justice Story in his camp substantiate
his claim that judicial tradition supports reliance on the framers' in-
tent for constitutional interpretation. Berger intimates that Story,
whom he describes as "perhaps the greatest scholar who sat on the
Supreme Court,' 3 believed that "effectuating the draftsman's inten-
tion"34 was the cardinal rule of constitutional interpretation. The
Justice did believe that interpreters should seek "intent," but he
meant not the intent of the draftsmen but rather the spirit of the
document seen as a living thing. Intent, he wrote, was to be found
primarily in the Constitution's "nature and objects, its scope and
design, as apparent from the structure of the instrument, viewed as
a whole, and also viewed in its component parts." 5
Indeed Story scornfully rejected the approach that Berger ad-
vocates:
Is the sense of the constitution to be ascertained, not by its own
text, but by the "probable meaning" to be gathered by conjectures
from scattered documents ... ? Is the constitution of the United
States to be the only instrument, which is not to be interpreted
by what is written, but by probable guesses, aside from the text? e
As his second justification for reliance on the framers' intent, Berger
argues that the framers had specific understandings of various clauses
and that it was these understandings that they intended to bind the
future.57 Even if one could prove-and Berger has not-that the framers
intended future generations to be bound by their specific understand-
51. Pp. 7, 136 n.12.
52. To prove his own consistency, Berger repeats his conceptual confusion in ref-
erences to Justices Cardozo, Wilson and Holmes. Pp. 289 n.24, 366, 367, 369.
53. P. 565.
54. Pp. 365-66.
55. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 405, at
387 (1st ed. Boston 1833).
56. Id. at 390 n.l. Justice Story also observed:
In many cases, no printed debates give any account of any construction; and where
any is given, different persons held different doctrines. Whose is to prevail? . . .
Are Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay, the expounders in the Federalist
to be followed[?] Or are others of a different opinion to guide us? Are we to be
governed by the opinions of a few, now dead, who have left them on record? Or
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ings, that intention is hardly self-justifying. At best such an argument
is circular, assuming what it has to prove-the binding character of
the framers' intent. Furthermore, Berger glides silently from the prem-
ise that if the framers' intent is unmistakably expressed, it is as good
as in the text,05 to the conclusion that more ambiguous indications
are also as good as text. This sort of reasoning is unpersuasive. 59
Third, Berger argues that, almost by definition, a constitutional
democracy is comnitted to the rule of law as a limitation on the dis-
cretion, and so on the power, of all public officials, including judges.
He finds nourishment in John Adams' sage dictum: "A frequent re-
currence to the fundamental principles of the constitution . . . [is]
absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty and to main-
tain a free government .... The people ... have a right to require
of their law givers and magistrates an exact and constant observance
of them."' 00 But a need to return to fundamental principles implies
no need to accept anything more than the fundamental principles
themselves; it does not imply a need to accept, much less search for,
what specific notions particular people may have had in mind. It is
58. P. 368.
59. Compounding Berger's error is the assumption that it has been "the Court's
practice over the years to consult the intention of the Framers." P. 367. That state-
ment has certainly been true for many Justices during this century, speaking both sep-
arately and for the Court. In the nineteenth century, judicial opinions made occasional
reference to The Federalist, to Madison's notes on the Convention, and to interpreta-
tions of the First Congress, but it was decidedly not the practice of American and English
judges during most of the nineteenth century to use the "legislative record" to justify
statutory or constitutional interpretation. See notes 55-56 supra; cf. Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding unconstitutional what Marshall claimed was con-
stitutional interpretation by First Congress); C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 476, 497-516
(1958) (British experience).
Not one of the opinions of the Court in early cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment cited a single line of debate in Congress or referred to a report of a legislative
committee. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1876); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875); Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The only reference to debates are two brief refer-
ences in Justice Field's dissent in Slaughter-House to remarks of Senator Trumbull about
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 92, 98 (1873).
By the turn of the century, courts were frequently citing such material; as Justice Pitney
noted in 1921, reports of House or Senate Committees may express legislative intent for
an otherwise obscure statute, Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1921).
Yet Pitney also observed that:
By repeated decisions of this court it has come to be well established that the de-
bates in Congress expressive of the views and motives of individual members are not a
safe guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and pur-
pose of the law-making body.
Id. at 474. See generally tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme
Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction (pts. 1-4), 26 CALIF. L. Rav. 287,
437, 655 (1938) 9. 27 CALIF. L. Rxv. 157 (1939) (means to establish framers' intent).
60. Quoted at p. 287. Adams's words were incorporated into the Massachusetts con-
stitution of 1780 and were paraphrased in several other early state constitutions.
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the fundamental principles in the Constitution that bind us, not the
ways in which one or some of the framers would have interpreted
those principles.
Indeed the internal logic of Berger's entire chapter on the rule
of law provides a much stronger argument for a literal interpretation
of the Constitution than for a search for what the framers may have
had in mind. As any candid analysis of Justice Black's jurisprudence
will indicate, literalism as a mode of constitutional interpretation has
ample problems of its own.61 Still, it has a great advantage over "in-
tent" in that the materials on which it depends are readily available
and thus provide much more tangible, though not necessarily more
effective, means of curbing judicial discretion.
The starting point of Berger's fourth justification-that the Con-
stitution embodies certain fundamental choices among values02-is, I
think, absolutely correct. His subsequent argument, however, shares
the same fallacy as his argument from the rule of law: acceptance of
a belief about fundamental choices in no logical way implies that fu-
ture generations are bound by what the framers may have had in
mind when they drafted the Constitution. Nor does acceptance of
the Constitution as a document containing a set of choices mean that
its interpreters may not have to create new rights to protect those
choices in a world of changing circumstances.
B. The Problems of Discovering the "Intent" of the Framers
I have said enough about difficulties with the "record" of the 39th
Congress as a window into the minds of its members. Even graver
difficulties arise when one tries, as Berger does in Part II of his book,
to explain the intent of the men of 1787. The hard truth is that we
have no collection of documents that anyone can plausibly argue
constitutes a full and accurate record of what the founders said at
Philadelphia. Madison's notes provide the most comprehensive ac-
count available, but they are far from complete. And, in contrast to
what many judges and commentators have implicitly assumed, Madi-
son never even pretended that he had constructed a full record. He
jotted down some notes while himself playing a leading role in de-
61. What does a literalist do when the literal commands of two constitutional pro-
visions, such as the free press and fair trial requirements, come into conflict? One re-
sponse is Justice Black's faith that the American people can and should protect both
freedoms. See Justice Black and the First Amendment's "Absolutes": A Public Interview,
in ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDOM: MR. JUSTIcE BLACK AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 474-76
(I. Dilliard ed. 1971). That response, however, is based on a cultural faith and a political
value judgment, not on a literal reading of the Constitution.
62. P. 291.
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bate; he wrote others during the evenings when he had more leisure;
still others he composed after the Convention had adjourned. 3 These
circumstances indicate that the notes were far from a verbatim tran-
script. Indeed, as would be expected, Madison's account disagrees at
places with the even more fragmentary memoranda of other partici-
pants.0 4 Moreover, some years later, when he had other sources against
which to check his memory, Madison edited those notes.65 One can
reject Crosskey's claim that Madison lied to conceal the inconsisten-
cies in his views over time 0 and still question the reliability of some
of the "record" that he left. In fact Madison never published his
own notes. They were published only after his death when his execu-
tors sold them to honor a bequest to his alma mater.
Thus even if we add to Madison's account what other framers
like Robert Yates wrote down, we still have no "record" of the de-
bates at the Constitutional Convention. There are only several sets
of informal notes that vary in completeness and accuracy. Yet those
who argue for intent as the lodestar of constitutional interpretation
seldom confront or even admit to this problem. 67
As do many other scholars and judges, Berger tries to fill the gaps
in the evidence about the intention of the men at Philadelphia by
utilizing The Federalist as an authoritative source. Without doubt,
most of these newspaper articles are brilliant political polemics, 8
and some-Numbers 10, 39, 51, and 78, for example-are powerful
expositions of hard-headed political philosophy. But Alpheus T. Mason
has amply documented that the authors of The Federalist were not
63. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 60
(1913).
64. Divergent recollections appear in the materials collected in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE
OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES (C. Tansill ed. 1927).
Compare the notes of Robert Yates, id. at 746-843, Rufus King, id. at 844-78, William
Patterson, id. at 879-912, William Pierce, id. at 87-95, Alexander Hamilton, id. at 913-22,
and James McHenry, id. at 923-52, with the notes of James Madison, id. at 109-745. Al-
though the most obvious differences involve remarks that are included and omitted, there
are substantive differences as well. Madison helped blur those between his own version
and that of Yates. When Yates's notes first became available, Madison labeled them a
"very erroneous edition of the matter," but he soon added some of Yates's material to his
own reports. I M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xviii
(1911).
65. Id. at xvi-xix.
66. 1 W. CRossREY, sutra note 12, at 12-13; 2 id. at 1009-13.
67. An exception is Crosskey. See id. at vii, 12.
68. Jefferson said The Federalist was "the best commentary on the principles of gov-
ernment which ever was written." But, he also told Madison that: "In some parts it
is discoverable that the author means only to say what may be best said in defence of
opinions in which he did not concur." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(November 18, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 53 (Ford ed.
1895).
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always consistent with each other nor each with himself."' As Madison
explained some of the problems to Jefferson: "Though carried on in
concert, the writers are not mutually answerable for all the ideas of
each other, there being seldom time for even a perusal of the pieces
by any but the writer before they were wanted at the press, and some-
times hardly by the writer himself."70 Furthermore, what the authors
of The Federalist say does not always agree with what Madison says
they argued for in the Convention. 71
Berger's use of Alexander Hamilton and Federalist No. 78 deserves
special comment. Like many other writers, Berger treats this tract as
if it were a definitive expression of the views of the framers. In fact,
he labels it "conclusive evidence" of what they had in mind.72
Federalist No. 78 certainly offers an eloquent, sophisticated, and in-
tellectually defensible jurisprudence. But there are difficulties in
presenting Hamilton's view as evidence, much less "conclusive evi-
dence," of a consensus among a majority of the framers.
First, from what Madison told Jefferson it is difficult to argue that
No. 78 represented a consensus among Jay, Madison, and Hamilton,
much less among others. Second, Hamilton is hardly an authority on
what the men at Philadelphia finally concluded about judicial re-
view. He had left the Convention when it was half over, long before
most of the hard issues were ultimately resolved.7 3 He returned once
or twice for a few days but was not a regular participant in debate
or deliberation. Third, given the paucity of debate about judicial re-
view recorded in Madison's or any one else's notes, one cannot say,
with any assurance whatsoever, that Hamilton's treatment of the topic
in No. 78 accorded even with what was said before he left the Con-
vention. In sum, one can accept or reject Hamilton's argument on
its own very considerable merits. But one cannot, on the basis of
sound logic or solid evidence, identify those views with the framers
generally.
69. Mason, The Federalist-A Split Personality, 57 AM. HiST. REV. 625 (1952).
70. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (August 10, 1788), reprinted in
5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 246 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
71. Madison first supported the Virginia Plan, which would have provided for a much
more centralized political system dominated by a unicameral Congress but later defended
in The Federalist a looser form of federalism and a much more independent and powerful
executive and judiciary. See THE FEDERALiST Nos. 10, 39-46 (J. Madison). Even more than
Madison, Hamilton urged centralization-until he found it expedient to tout federalism.
See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15-17, 32-34, 82 (A. Hamilton); Roche, The Founding Fathers:
A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 799, 804 (1961) ("The Federalist is
probative evidence for only one proposition: that Hamilton and Madison were inspired
propagandists with a genius for retrospective symmetry.")
72. P. 293.
73. M. FARRAND, supra note 63, at 197.
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There is yet another grave problem about "intent" that Berger,
like most of its advocates, ignores. The Constitution and its amend-
ments are not the products of a national convention or of Congress
alone. They were ratified by other institutions-either state legis-
latures or conventions. What about the intentions of the more than
1600 ratifiers? If their views count, what were they? We have a good
deal of information, though again incomplete, about what was said
in the state conventions after the Constitution was proposed.7 4 Yet
what we now know of those debates hardly shows consensus on much
more than a willingness to give the new Constitution a fair trial.7 5
On the ratification of the original Constitution, Berger offers scat-
tered quotations and comments but not copious evidence or systematic
analysis. On the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, Berger offers
neither evidence nor comment. Given the amendment's rough road
to ratification,70 his analysis would have been especially interesting.
It would be useful to know how unusual were the views of men like
the elder Justice Harlan, who thought that the amendment national-
ized the Bill of Rights77 and, together with the Thirteenth Amend-
74. See THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (J. Elliot ed. Washington 1836) (relying heavily on newspaper
accounts).
75. Merrill Jensen's projected fifteen to tventy volumes of documents on ratification
may present a different picture. See M. JENSEN, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Volumes I, II, III published 1976; others forthcoming).
Yet even that massive scholarship is unlikely to offer a complete view of the intent of
these latter-day framers. See Robinson, Jensen's Monument: Documents on Constitutional
Ratification, 5 REvs. AM. HisT. 326 (1977).
76. Congress submitted the amendment to all thirty-seven states, but within a year
each of the ex-Confederate states except Tennessee had rejected the amendment, as had
Delaware and Kentucky. In two state legislatures, Oregon and New Jersey, ratification
was by a slim and questionable margin. New Jersey, along with Ohio, later tried to
rescind approval. Only after Congress required six states of the old Confederacy to ratify
as a condition for readmission to the Union, and the Secretary of State rejected New
Jersey and Ohio's efforts to change their minds, was the requisite approval of three-
quarters of the states obtained. Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State ex-
pressed doubts about the validity of the amendment, and Congress itself proclaimed
ratification. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4295-96 (1868); cf. Suthon, The Dubious
Origin of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 TUL. L. REV. 22 (1953) (amendment not legiti-
mate part of Constitution). See generally, M. BENEDICT, supra note 9; J. JAMES, supra note
44; J. RANDALL, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 740, 786-90 (1937); James, sutra note
44; James, Southern Reaction to the Proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment, 22 J.S. HIsT.
477 (1956).
77. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As a political activist before
coming to the Court, Harlan had opposed ratification even of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. See L. Filler, John M. Harlan, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969, at 1281-82 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969); Westin, John Marshall
Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner,
66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957). Berger does devote attention to the younger John Marshall Harlan.
See, e.g., pp. 152, 222.
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ment, authorized Congress to outlaw segregation in such public facili-
ties at inns, theaters, and coaches.78 Similarly, it would be helpful to
explore the extent to which ratifiers thought, as did Governor David
Walker of Florida, that the amendment would allow Congress "'to
legislate in all cases touching the citizenship, life, liberty or property
of every individual in the Union, of whatever race or color,'" and
thus effectively to eliminate any need for state governments.79 Even
assuming once again that there was a single intent and not ten or
fifty different intents, the task of discovering the intent of this echelon
of framers is staggering. In fact, given the dearth of records of state
legislative debates, the task may be impossible.80
Yet, if one claims that the intent of the framers is the critical ele-
ment in constitutional construction, one cannot refuse to do the la-
bor needed to uncover that intent. It is even less intellectually legiti-
mate to pretend that the labor is unnecessary. If in the end one re-
luctantly concludes that the task is impossible, then at very least one
must modify the prescription to read: "Because in the real world,
we cannot discover the intent of the framers, other standard(s) must
be used." If one refuses to make that modification, one is, in effect,
relegating constitutional interpretation not to historians but to seers.8 '
C. Practical Effects
If the United States had to undergo the delay and uncertainty of
the amending process every time a problem arose that the framers had
not foreseen or had foreseen in such a different context as to distort
their vision of later problems, the practical effects would destroy the
78. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments allow Congress to outlaw segregation by
private individuals who operate public facilities); cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that two amendments forbid states to require
segregation in public facilities).
79. Statement of David Walker, reprinted in James, supra note 76, at 491.
80. See Anderson, The Intention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 49 AM. POL. Smc. REv. 340, 350 (1955) (beyond human capacity conclusively to
connect fleeting, subjective intentions of framers to written words in text).
Justice Story concluded: "[T]here can be no certainty, either that the different state
conventions in ratifying the constitution, gave the same uniform interpretation to its
language, or that, even in a single state convention, the same reasoning prevailed with a
majority, much less with the whole of the supporters of it." 1 J. STORY, supra note 55, at
388-89.
81. Responding to some of his critics, Berger refers to the "brute facts" brought out
by his book and complains that most critics' real quarrel is with the framers-either of
the original Constitution or of the Fourteenth Amendment. Berger, Academe vs. the
Founding Fathers, 30 NAT'L REv. 468, 470 (1978). The message of this review is that
Berger's argument relies far less on "brute facts" about whatever it was the framers in-
tended and more on incomplete research and gossamery guesses about what they may have
had in mind.
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country. A constitution "intended to endure for ages to come," as
Marshall described it,8 2 or to provide unity, justice, tranquillity, de-
fense, welfare, and liberty for "ourselves and our posterity," as the
men of 1787 wrote, could hardly perform its functions if it were a
legal strait jacket. Berger's crabbed view of constitutional interpreta-
tion implies that the framers were either omniscient gods who foresaw
all possible problems and provided ready solutions, or were arrogant
fools who thought they were gods. Whether one thinks of the framers
as saints or sinners, the plain fact is that the language they chose for the
Constitution is often sweeping rather than precise, proclaiming gen-
eral principles rather than mandating specific solutions.8 3
More persuasive than any argument offered in Government by Ju-
diciary is the view that if the framers were men of intelligence, they
would not have intended their specific interpretations of the sweeping
language they used to bind future generations. They would have
recognized that the future would bring problems that the framers had
never encountered or foreseen.8 4
Madison himself conceded that the language of the original Con-
stitution admitted of several quite different meanings. It was, he said,
82. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
83. Berger argues that the framers of 1787 were legal positivists, for only positivists
would view a constitution or interpret it in such narrow terms. Pp. 386-91. A posi-
tivist, of course, need not be so rigid as Berger; even Hans Kelsen admitted the inevi-
tability of a creative role for judges. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
135 (1945). Berger fails to recognize that some of the framers-perhaps most-were de-
cidedly not positivists but believers in natural law and natural right. See Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 387-88 (1798) (Chase, J., asserting that reason and justice, judicially
enforced, form constitutional restrictions on legislative action); R. FAULKNER, THE JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 9-20 (1968) (Marshall's adherence to natural law/natural
rights); Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (M. Harmon ed. 1978) (natural rights theory reflected in early
case law).
Berger apparently relied on Robert Cover's excellent book, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975),
as an authority for denying the prevalence of natural law/natural rights during the early
period. But Cover is concerned with problems that came to the courts largely after 1825.
During the founding period, theories of natural law and natural rights retained wide
influence. See, e.g., E. CoRwiN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL Ltw (1955); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 (1969);
B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW (1931). Believers in natural
law/natural rights would be apt to see a constitution (or even a statute) as containing
general principles that need to be adapted to changing circumstances in order to secure
justice and/or protect fundamental rights. That one disagrees with such a school of
thought provides no intellectually respectable justification for pretending that it was
not highly influential during the period in which the Constitution was framed and first
expounded. Indeed, as Wright makes clear for the 1920s and as one can cogently argue
for Earl Warren's chief justiceship, the influence of that school tends to sleep rather
than die.
84. One must carefully distinguish between general principles such as limited govern-
ment and the rule of law and specific notions of the meaning of these principles in
concrete situations. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977).
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nothing to be ashamed of, for: "When the Almighty himself con-
descends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning,
luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the cloudy
medium through which it is communicated."8' s As Cardozo once said,
an interpreter of the Constitution has to discern "what today [the
framers] would believe, if they were called upon to interpret ... the
constitution that they framed for the needs of an expanding future."-,
It is, however, legitimate to demand that interpreters of the Con-
stitution remain faithful to the underlying principles embodied in
the structure and spirit of the document. Otherwise, judicial discre-
tion may turn into judicial license. But in weighing the effectiveness
of various limitations on judicial discretion, one should keep in mind
that it was Taney in Dred Scott8 7 who relied on the "intent of the
framers," not Warren in Brown;8 that it was Sutherland and his
ideological brethren who used "intent" to keep laissez-faire ruling
constitutional law, not Brandeis and Cardozo with their more candid
social engineering. Search for intent restrains judicial discretion less
than most approaches to constitutional interpretation because it is
based on the usually self-deceptive myth that there is such a discover-
able entity as a single intent on particular matters.
Instead, we should view a constitution as a charter for govern-
ance. It is a political credo: a set of authoritative statements about a
society's basic goals. It is also a design for legitimate processes to
achieve those goals, and for allocations of power to-as well as re-
strictions on the power of-officials who in society's name impose
costs and benefits toward achievement of its general goals. Because
of the broad and basic political character of a constitution, it is not
amenable to the rules of interpretation that apply to private contracts
or to statutes. Because of the complex nature of the interlocking ar-
rangements contained in a constitution, an interpreter must look at
it as a whole, examine its structure, as Charles Black would say. s0
Implicit in that structure is an ordering of values, a series of choices
among substantive ends and procedures to achieve those ends. Those
choices may have been made at different times, by different people,
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison) 236-37 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
86. Draft of an unused concurring opinion by Justice Cardozo in Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), reprinted in A. MASON & W. BEANEY, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 393-94 (6th ed. 1978). After reading this opinion, Chief Justice
Hughes modified his draft opinion for the Court to include the gist of Justice Cardozo's
reasoning. See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE 360-65 (1956).
87. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857).
88. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
89. See C. BLACK, STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
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for different purposes; and one of an interpreter's most difficult tasks
is to reconcile those differences.
Furthermore, a constitution has a spirit as well as a body, as both
Marshall 0 and Story ' noted. The notion of the rule of law-which
Berger rightly emphasizes-is nowhere specifically endorsed in the
American Constitution or in any of its amendments. But it is there.
There also, at least since the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
is the notion of the equal worth and dignity of all human beings. To
make a constitution m6re than a political artifact, an interpreter must
discover these and other basic principles-in effect, the spirit-that
inform the document and apply them to conditions its framers never
knew.
To interpret a constitution requires more than ingenious guesses
about what its draftsmen were thinking. Constitutional interpreta-
tion is an art, an art that must sometimes be both creative and po-
litical in the highest sense of that word, for it must apply imper-
fectly stated general principles to concrete and complex problems of
human life and it must produce an authoritative solution. An inter-
preter who wishes to uphold, defend, maintain, or preserve the Ameri-
can Constitution cannot rationally treat it either as a detailed code
or as a compact computer whose machine language is locked in the
minds of men long dead. The root of the problem of constitutional
interpretation lies in the stubborn refusal of the real world to stand
still so that immutable general principles can have immutable appli-
cations to human behavior. The ongoing task for those who would
interpret the Constitution is similarly to avoid the pretense that the
world stands still and instead work to link the values of the past to
the demands of the future.
90. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383-84 (1821); Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 645 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
91. 1 J. STORY, suPra note 55, §§ 422, 427, 455; see Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
204, 225 (1821).
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